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This paper examines how collateral and personal guarantees affect firms’ ex-post performance 
employing the propensity score matching estimation approach. Based on a unique firm-level 
panel data set of more than 500 small and medium-sized borrower firms in Japan, we find the 
following: (1) the increase in profitability and reduction in riskiness of borrowers that provide 
collateral to lenders are more sizeable than of borrowers that do not; (2) On the other hand, the 
lending attitude and monitoring frequency of borrowers' main banks do not change significantly 
at the time of collateral being pledged; and (3) The increase in profitability of collateralized 
borrowers is driven by cost reductions rather than by sales growth. These findings are consistent 
with the hypothesis that by providing collateral, borrowers curb their own incentives for moral 
hazard in order to further enhance their creditworthiness. 
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1. Introduction 
How effective are collateral and personal guarantees in improving economic welfare? A 
substantial number of theoretical studies, including Bester (1985), Boot, Thakor, and Udell 
(1991), and Stulz and Johnson (1985), suggest that the use of loan securities such as collateral in 
an environment of asymmetric information leads to possible welfare gains by limiting adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems. For example, Boot, Thakor, and Udell argue that collateral 
pledged by risky borrowers induces them to exert greater managerial effort in order to reduce 
the default probability, and thus attenuates the problem of moral hazard. Stulz and Johnson 
argue that collateral reduces perverse incentives for borrowers to choose risky projects at 
creditors’ expense (asset substitution). This type of effect should be captured by observing the 
ex-post performance of borrowers who pledge collateral. However, despite the large number of 
empirical studies on the use of collateral, little attention has been paid to the effect of collateral 
on the ex-post performance of borrower firms. Exceptions in this regard are Berger and Udell 
(1990), and Jiménez and Saurina (2004). These studies, however, do not appropriately deal with 
possible selection bias problems in the provision of collateral. 
Against this background, the present paper represents the first attempt to examine the 
effect of collateral and personal guarantees on borrowers’ ex-post performance, appropriately 
controlling for possible selection biases. As the subject of our analysis, we focus on small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Japan, which tend to be heavily dependent on bank loans. 
Our analysis is based on a unique firm-level panel data set of more than 500 Japanese SMEs 
covering the years 2001-2005. 
For our empirical investigation, we employ the propensity score matching estimation 
approach proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). Propensity score matching has become a 
popular method for estimating treatment effects and has been widely applied in a diverse range   2
of fields. To our knowledge, however, this paper is the first attempt to apply matching 
estimation in the domain of small business lending. We first estimate propensity scores, which 
are the probabilities of a borrower pledging collateral conditional on the relevant covariates, 
including borrowers’ characteristics. Next, we produce a match for each collateralized borrower 
by choosing non-collateralized borrowers with the “closest” propensity scores to that of the 
collateralized borrower. We use these collateralized borrowers as the treatment group and the 
selected uncollateralized borrowers as the control group. Finally, we observe the difference 
between the treatment group and the control group in terms of their performance one year later. 
We find that riskier firms are more likely to pledge collateral and that their 
performance one year later is improved. This result is consistent with the “moral hazard 
hypothesis,” which predicts that collateral induces risky firms to increase managerial effort to 
avoid defaulting on a loan, or reduces risky firms’ incentives to engage in asset substitution. In 
either case, collateral improves borrower firms’ ex-post performance. Our finding would also be 
compatible with the alternative hypothesis that collateral enhances lenders’ monitoring incentive 
(monitoring hypothesis) and the hypothesis that collateral improves borrowing firms’ access to 
larger amounts of credit (availability hypothesis). We obtain, however, little empirical support 
for these hypotheses. To some extent, the above findings also hold for personal guarantees, but 
the results are weaker.   
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 provides a description of the 
existing theoretical and empirical literature on collateral and personal guarantees; Section 3 
posits our empirical hypotheses to be examined; Section 4 explains our data set and the 
empirical methodology employed; Section 5 presents the empirical results accompanied by a 
variety of robustness checks; and Section 6 concludes.   
   3
2. Previous Literature 
There is an abundance of theoretical and empirical literature on the use of collateral. We review 
three strands of literature that are relevant for our analysis on the relationship between collateral 
and the ex-post performance of borrower firms. These focus, respectively, on the relationship 
between collateral and borrowers’ credit risk, the relationship between collateral and the 
lender’s screening and monitoring activities, and the relationship between collateral and loan 
availability. 
We begin with the literature on the relationship between collateral and borrowers’ 
credit risk. Lending practitioners frequently point out that risky firms are more likely to pledge 
collateral. That is, financial institutions assess the riskiness of applicant firms in order to 
determine whether to extend secured loans, unsecured loans, or no loans at all. If a financial 
institution finds that an applicant qualifies for a secured loan, it will ask the prospective 
borrower to pledge collateral. Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991) develop a theoretical model of 
this “sorting-by-observed risk” practice. They consider the situation in which the quality of the 
borrower’s project is known to both the borrower and the lender but the borrower’s effort is 
private information. The model of Boot, Thakor, and Udell predicts that, in equilibrium, the 
safer borrower is offered an unsecured loan, while the riskier borrower is offered a collateralized 
loan, because it is the riskier borrower whose marginal return to effort is larger.
5 Thus, 
                                                      
5  The “sorting-by-observed risk” hypothesis represents one convincing theory of what determines 
whether a borrower pledges collateral; however, there is another plausible hypothesis in which 
borrower riskiness is assumed to be unobservable. This hypothesis is referred to as the 
“sorting-by-unobserved risk,” or signaling hypothesis. Bester (1985), for example, argues that 
collateral can produce sorting across borrower types when the pledging of collateral is costly. 
Similarly, Besanko and Thakor (1987) posit that in the case where lenders are at an informational 
disadvantage regarding borrowers’ default probability, collateral can attenuate credit rationing. These 
theoretical studies suggest that there is a negative relationship between collateral and (unobservable) 
borrower riskiness, because safer borrowers tend to pledge collateral as a signaling device to inform 
lenders that they are actually less risky. However, there are few empirical studies that provide 
support for the “sorting-by-unobserved risk” hypothesis. One exception is the study by Jiménez, 
Salas, and Saurina (2006), which examines how ex-post borrower riskiness is associated with the use 
of collateral and finds that, among sub-samples of young firms, safer borrowers are more likely to   4
collateral provides an incentive to limit moral hazard by the borrower. Stulz and Johnson (1985) 
argue that collateral is useful in mitigating another type of moral hazard: asset substitution. If 
the borrower’s actions after the loan is extended are private information, then firms with little 
capital have incentives to choose risky projects or cash payouts at the expense of creditors. 
Collateral prevents firms from engaging in such asset substitution. 
Based on Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991) and Stulz and Johnson (1985), we can make 
two empirical predictions. First, the provision of collateral is positively associated with the 
borrower’s ex-ante riskiness. Second, collateralized borrowers become less risky over time, 
because they make greater efforts to avoid defaulting and/or refrain from asset substitution. 
There are many studies providing empirical evidence for the first prediction, including the 
seminal work by Orgler (1970) as well as recent studies such as Berger and Udell (1990; 1995), 
Brick and Palia (2007), Jiménez, Salas, and Saurina (2006), and Jiménez and Saurina (2004). 
However, there are few empirical studies that have investigated the ex-post performance of 
collateralized borrowers, exceptions being Berger and Udell (1990) and Jiménez and Saurina 
(2004). Both of these studies find that the ex-post performance of collateralized borrowers, such 
as the probability of default, is worse than that of uncollateralized borrowers, and they attribute 
this finding to the higher ex-ante riskiness of collateralized borrowers. In other words, there are 
no empirical studies which find ex-post improvements of collateralized borrowers’ performance, 
presumably because it is difficult to control for the possible selection bias of collateral 
provision. 
The second strand of literature examines the relationship between collateral and the 
lender’s screening and monitoring activities. Manove, Padilla, and Pagano (2001) investigate 
the relationship between the use of collateral and screening by the lender. They argue that 
                                                                                                                                                            
pledge collateral.   5
collateral is considered as a substitute for the evaluation of borrowers’ riskiness. Thus, banks 
that are highly protected by collateral may become “lazy” in the sense that they perform less 
screening than what is socially optimal for the projects they finance. Longhofer and Santos 
(2000) and Rajan and Winton (1995), on the other hand, show theoretically that collateral may 
serve as a contractual device to increase the lender’s screening and monitoring incentive. 
Longhofer and Santos, for example, argue that collateral is effective in raising the bank’s 
seniority in the presence of several creditors and enhances its screening and monitoring. 
However, the empirical evidence on the relationship between collateral and lenders’ screening 
and monitoring is mixed. Jiménez, Salas, and Saurina (2006), for example, find that banks with 
a low level of expertise in small business lending use collateral as a substitute for poor 
evaluation capabilities, while Voordeckers and Steijvers (2006) suggest that the intensity of 
credit evaluation does not have a significant effect on whether loans are collateralized. 
Meanwhile, Ono and Uesugi (2008) find evidence that monitoring intensity by the main bank, 
as measured by the frequency of document submission, is positively associated with collateral 
being pledged. 
Finally, many of the theoretical studies that provide a positive rationale for collateral 
predict that collateral increases loan availability. For example, Bester (1985) and Besanko and 
Thakor (1987) show that under informational asymmetry, collateral serves as a sorting device 
for borrowers’ ex-ante riskiness and thus attenuates credit rationing, enabling them to 
implement projects with positive net present value (NPV). Similarly, Stulz and Johnson (1985) 
argue that by providing collateral to creditors, borrowers become less likely to suffer from the 
underinvestment problem. Focusing on lenders’ incentives, Inderst and Mueller (2007) show 




3. Empirical Hypotheses 
Based on the theoretical literature on how ex-post borrower characteristics are affected by the 
use of collateral, we have several testable hypotheses. Our main focus is on the association 
between borrower riskiness and collateral. We posit the following theoretical predictions:
7 
 
Hypothesis 1 (Moral Hazard Hypothesis): Borrowers with high observed riskiness are more 
likely to pledge collateral and improve their performances afterward by exerting greater effort, 
resulting in increased profitability, and/or by refraining from asset substitution, resulting in 
reduced riskiness. Alternatively, if the lender requires observably risky borrowers to pledge 
collateral in order to reduce its risk exposure and to substitute for its monitoring effort, then 
there is no reduction in the ex-post riskiness of collateralized borrowers. 
 
The reasoning underlying the first part of this hypothesis is based on Boot, Thakor, 
and Udell (1991) and Stulz and Johnson (1985). Boot, Thakor, and Udell argue that it is riskier 
borrowers that tend to provide collateral, and then choose a higher level of managerial effort. 
The reason for this incentive effect is that collateralized borrowers would lose their pledged 
assets upon default, and hence strive to decrease their default probability by increasing their 
efforts. Moreover, because the decrease in default probability by choosing a higher level of 
effort is larger for riskier firms, it is riskier borrowers that are more likely to pledge collateral. 
                                                      
6  In contrast, the model of Manove, Padilla, and Pagano (2001) shows that “lenient” provision of 
secured credit may be bad for society because lenders approve projects with negative NPV. 
7  As noted in footnote 5, there exists another important hypothesis, the “sorting-by-unobserved risk” 
hypothesis, which predicts that borrowers with low unobserved riskiness are more likely to pledge 
collateral. However, since it is difficult to identify borrowers’ unobservable riskiness in our data set, 
we do not explicitly examine this hypothesis. We will briefly discuss how the 
“sorting-by-unobserved risk” hypothesis is related to our empirical results in footnote 15.   7
Stulz and Johnson consider the agency problem between firm owners and debt holders. Because 
of limited liability, firm owners may prefer to choose risky projects at the expense of lenders, 
with this agency problem being particularly acute for financially distressed firms. Collateral will 
prevent a distressed firm from engaging in such asset substitution, and thus riskier firms tend to 
pledge collateral more often. 
The latter part of the hypothesis, which is based on the model by Manove, Padilla, and 
Pagano, emphasizes lenders’ incentive to reduce their exposure to borrowers’ credit risk. In this 
case, lenders who are protected by collateral may perform less screening and monitoring than 
what is socially optimal, which results in a deteriorating ex-post performance of borrowers.   
The next two hypotheses concern how collateralized borrowers improve their 
performance. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (Monitoring Hypothesis): The performance of collateralized borrowers improves 
after the loan is made because they are subject to more intensive monitoring by financial 
institutions. 
 
Hypothesis 3 (Availability Hypothesis): Collateralized borrowers experience a greater 
improvement in performance because they find it easier to gain approval for larger loan 
amounts. 
 
Hypothesis 2 is based on the theoretical models of Longhofer and Santos (2000) and 
Rajan and Winton (1995), in which collateral serves as a contractual device to increase the 
lender’s monitoring incentive. More intensive monitoring by the lender attenuates the problem 
of borrower moral hazard and thus improves borrowers’ creditworthiness and performance.   8
Another possible path for borrowers to improve their performance is through better access to 
funds in order to implement projects with positive net present value, which we posit in 
Hypothesis 3. Besanko and Thakor (1987), for example, show that collateral mitigates the 
problem of credit rationing and thus improves credit availability. Similarly, if collateral reduces 
the agency problem between shareholders and lenders, it also increases the provision of credit 
(Stulz and Johnson, 1985). By investing funds in projects with positive net present value, 
collateralized borrowers will improve their profitability and creditworthiness.   
Hypotheses 2 and 3 are compatible with the first part of Hypothesis 1 in that all three 
hypotheses expect that the performance of collateralized borrowers will improve; in other words, 
they are not mutually exclusive. For example, lenders are eager to provide more funds to those 
who pledge collateral (Hypothesis 3) because the moral hazard incentive for such borrowers is 
curbed (Hypothesis 1). However, Hypotheses 2 and 3 contrast with the first part of Hypothesis 1 
in that the improvements in borrowers’ performance are driven by the lenders’ incentives and 
actions such as their monitoring frequency and their willingness to supply larger loan amounts, 
while Hypothesis 1 focuses solely on borrowers’ incentives. 
 
4. Data Set and Empirical Approach 
4.1 Data 
We construct a firm-level panel data set to analyze the ex-post performance of borrowers. The 
data set is based on the Surveys of the Financial Environment (SFE) implemented by the Small 
and Medium Enterprise Agency of Japan in the years 2001-2004, and the Financial Information 
Database (FID) that covers the years 2001-2005 and is collated by Tokyo Shoko Research Inc., 
a commercial credit research firm. The yearly SFE survey is based on a sample drawn from the 
FID that contains the balance sheets and income statements of firms. The SFE asks a variety of   9
detailed questions regarding the financial transactions between a borrower and its main bank, 
such as the usage of collateral and personal guarantees. By combining the SFE and the FID, we 
have a rich firm-level data set that includes not only the financial statements of surveyed firms, 
but also qualitative information regarding their financial transactions. 
For our analysis, we need information for at least three periods in order to examine the 
effect of collateral on borrowers’ ex-post performance. We also need to know whether collateral 
is provided in periods t-1 and t, and the development of borrowers’ performance between 
periods  t  and  t+1. Using the data in period t-1 and t, we produce a “match” for each 
collateralized borrower with non-collateralized borrowers by estimating a probit model that 
takes account of the various factors that are likely to affect whether borrowers pledge collateral. 
Then, using the data from periods t and t+1, we measure the effect of collateral on borrowers’ 
ex-post performance by observing the difference between matched collateralized borrowers and 
non-collateralized borrowers. 
Combining the SFE and FID, and using five years of data, we construct three panel 
data sets for the years 2001-2003, 2002-2004, and 2003-2005. We then concatenate these three 
data sets into one panel data set. The initial year of each panel data set is labeled year t-1, the 
second year is year t, and the final year is year t+1. We add dummies representing the initial 
year in order to distinguish these three panel data sets with different starting years.   
For our analysis, we exclude the following observations from our data set. First, 
observations where one or more of the variables (described in the next subsection) fall into 
either the upper or lower 0.5 percentile of the total distribution were omitted from the sample. 
Second, in order to focus on firms that mostly depend on bank loans for their financing, the 
sample is restricted to borrowers that fulfill the legal definition of SMEs in Japan, which is a 
firm that has either 300 or fewer employees, or 300 million yen or less of registered capital.   10
Third, the sample is confined to firms with positive borrowings outstanding; that is, firms whose 
short-term loans, long-term loans and discounted bills outstanding add up to zero are omitted 
from the sample. Fourth, in order to identify the year in which borrowers newly pledged 
collateral (personal guarantees), observations of firms that used collateral (personal guarantees) 
in period t-1 are omitted.   
Lastly, and most importantly, the effects of government credit guarantees on collateral 
need to be isolated. We deal with this issue by omitting from the sample all observations of 
borrowers that made use of government guarantee programs in any way.
8 We do so because 
loans covered by the credit guarantee program enjoy a 100 percent guarantee of principal and 
interest, meaning that lenders bear no credit risk for the guaranteed loan amounts and thus have 
no incentive to require borrowers to pledge collateral.   
 
4.2 Variables 
After screening our data as aforementioned, we are left with 543 observations for the analysis 
on collateral and 766 observations for the analysis on personal guarantees.
9 The variables we 
use are as follows. 
First, in order to distinguish whether a borrower’s loan is collateralized or not, we use 
two binary variables: whether collateral is used ( t COLL ) or whether personal guarantees are 
used ( t GUAR ). The SFE defines collateral as physical assets or securities that the creditor can 
sell in the event that the borrower defaults. A personal guarantee refers to a contractual 
                                                      
8 Note, however, that the borrowers not covered by government guarantees in any way are larger 
and less risky. Hence, limiting our sample to borrowers that do not use government credit guarantee 
programs at all may introduce a size bias in the sample. As a robustness check, we also employ 
another data set which excludes only borrowers whose entire loans were covered by government 
credit guarantees (see Section 5.3). 
9 The corresponding numbers of observations when we count borrowers whose entire portfolio of 
loans from their main banks is not completely guaranteed by the government are 701 (collateral) and 
928 (personal guarantees). Descriptive statistics for this data set are presented in the Appendix Table.     11
obligation of the business representative to repay loans in the event of a default. The dummy 
variable  t COLL  ( t GUAR ) equals one if the borrower does not pledge collateral (personal 
guarantees) in year t-1 but newly pledges collateral (personal guarantees) in year t to its main 
bank;  t COLL  ( t GUAR ) equals zero if the borrower does not pledge collateral (personal 
guarantees) in either year t-1 or t. In our sample, the number of borrowers that newly pledge 
collateral (personal guarantees) in year t is 115 (179), while the number of borrowers that 
continue not to pledge collateral (personal guarantees) is 428 (587). 
Second, we use two sets of variables to evaluate ex-post firm performance and to 
examine Hypothesis 1. The first set of variables measures firm performance: the profitability of 
a firm as measured by the return on assets ( t ROA : the ratio of pre-tax operating profits to total 
assets) and the interest coverage ratio ( t ICOVER : the ratio of pre-tax operating profits to interest 
expenses), while the creditworthiness of a firm as measured by the capital ratio ( t CAP : the ratio 
of capital to total assets). The second set of variables captures whether a firm is in financial 
distress. For this, we use several binary dummy variables, including a dummy indicating 
whether a borrower defaults on a loan in year t ( t DEFAULT ), a dummy for a negative ROA 
( t NG ROA_ ) meaning the firm is in deficit, a dummy for interest coverage being less than or 
equal to unity ( t SM ICOVER_ ) meaning operating profit is insufficient to cover interest 
expenses, and a dummy for a negative capital ratio ( t NG CAP _ ), that is, the firm has negative 
net worth.   
Third, in order to investigate Hypotheses 2 and 3, the following variables are 
employed. Hypothesis 2 relates ex-post firm performance to the lender’s monitoring activity. 
Our proxy variable for the lender’s monitoring is the frequency of a firm’s document 
submissions to its main bank ( t DOC ).  t DOC   ranges from a minimum index value of 1 for the 
lowest document submission frequency (once a year) to a maximum of 4 for the highest   12
document submission frequency (once every one or two months). Hypothesis 3 attributes 
ex-post firm performance to the availability of credit to the borrower firm. We measure the 
availability of credit by an index variable of the main bank’s response to a borrower’s loan 
application ( t RES ) and the fixed-asset ratio ( t FIXED ).  t RES  takes a value of 1 if an 
application was rejected or the loan amount was reduced, a value of 2 if a loan application was 
approved, and a value of 3 if the lender solicited the borrower to increase the loan amount.
10 
t FIXED  is the ratio of fixed tangible assets to total assets. We use this variable because if the 
collateral increases loan availability for borrower firms, then it is likely to result in increases in 
their fixed investment. 
Finally, the following are the proxy variables we employ for borrower characteristics 
and the borrower-lender relationship that determine the use of collateral and personal guarantees 
in period t. Firm characteristic variables include the log of the number of employees ( t LnEMP ), 
the log of total borrowings ( t LnLIAB ), the long-term borrowing ratio ( t LONG : the ratio of 
long-term loans, with maturity greater than one year, to total assets), the land ratio ( t LAND : the 
ratio of real estate holdings to total assets), the cash ratio ( t CASH : the ratio of cash holdings to 
total assets), and the interest payment rate ( t RATE : interest expenses divided by the total 
amount of borrowing). These variables are constructed from a firm’s financial statements in the 
FID. To measure the extent of commingling risk that is likely to be positively associated with 
the use of personal guarantees, we construct a dummy variable that equals one if a family 
member of the CEO of the borrower firm is a major shareholder ( t OWNER ). As proxies for the 
borrower-lender relationship, we use the number of banks with which the borrower has 
transactions ( t BANKS ) and the log of the duration of the borrower-main bank relationship 
                                                      
10  We also employ an alternative definition of t RES , where it is a binary dummy variable that takes 
a value of 1 if an application was rejected or the loan amount reduced, and 0 otherwise. The 
empirical results obtained are qualitatively the same in both cases; therefore, we only report the 
results for our main definition of  t RES .   13
( t LnDURATION ). The underlying assumption is that the smaller the number of banks that a 
borrower has transactions with and the longer the years that a borrower has transactions with the 
main bank, the more solid are the borrower-lender relationships. Year, industry, and regional 
dummies as well as a dummy for the type of main bank are also included. 
 
4.3 Empirical Approach 
Using the data set just described, we proceed to examine the effect of borrowers’ pledging of 
collateral. Note, however, that a simple comparison of the ex-post performance of collateral 
users and non-users is not appropriate because of possible selection bias. For example, if the 
borrower firms that pledge collateral are riskier than those not pledging collateral, then a simple 
comparison of the ex-post performance between the two groups confounds ex-ante riskiness and 
ex-post riskiness (changes in borrowers’ riskiness after the loan is extended). To circumvent the 
problem, we need to control for any possible selection bias in our estimation. To do so, we 
employ the matching estimation approach. The procedure is as follows: 
 
(i) We implement a probit estimation that models the probability of borrowers’ 
pledging collateral in year t conditional on covariates observed in the same year. Borrowers that 
pledge collateral ( 1 = t COLL ) are labeled treatment observations. We then attach a propensity 
score to each observation. The propensity score  () ⋅ e   is defined as 
() () t t t X COLL X e 1 Pr = ≡  (1) 
where  t X   is a vector of covariates in the collateral equation. 
(ii) Next, for each treatment observation, we identify matched observations from the 
uncollateralized borrower sample. The matched observations are those that have the “closest” 
propensity scores to a particular treatment observation and are labeled control observations.   14
These matched observations are chosen from the same calendar year as the treatment 
observation. It should also be noted that we use a non-treated observation more than once as a 
control, that is, a non-treatment observation may be used as a control for one treatment 
observation and as a control for another treatment observation at the same time. There are 
several matching algorithms to find the “closest” control observations. As a baseline for our 
analysis, we employ k nearest matching, in which the arbitrarily determined k observations 
whose propensity scores are the closest to each treatment observation are chosen.
11  
(iii) Finally, we compare the change (yearly difference) in the ex-post performance 
variables of the treatment and the control group from year t to year t+1. To be precise, to test 
Hypothesis 1 we use the difference-in-difference (DID) estimator regarding firms’ ex-post 




t Y Y 1 1 + + Δ − Δ  
where  Y   indicates the performance variable and uppercase  T  and C   stand for the treatment 
and the control group, respectively. We expect an improvement in the DID estimators if the 
moral hazard hypothesis applies. To examine the validity of Hypotheses 2 and 3, we calculate 
the DID with respect to the monitoring and availability variables. For Hypotheses 2 and 3, we 
measure the changes from year t-1 to t because these hypotheses presume contemporaneous 
relationships between the proxy variables and the provision of collateral. We expect a more 
sizable increase of document submission frequency, a larger improvement of the main bank’s 
lending attitude, and a more sizable increase of the fixed-asset ratio if these hypotheses hold. 
 
One of the benefits of employing propensity score matching estimation is that we can 
match treatment and control observations using the scalar propensity score. The propensity 
                                                      
11  In this paper we use k=5. Because the results of our estimation may be sensitive to the matching 
algorithm we choose, as a robustness check, in Section 5.3 we also report results using different 
matching algorithms: 10-nearest matching, radius matching, and kernel matching.   15
score, which is the conditional probability of being treated given the value of observed 
characteristics, is a very useful variable in dealing with a highly dimensional vector of 
covariates. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that treatment observations (in our case those 
who pledged collateral) and control observations (those who did not pledge collateral) with the 
same propensity score value have the same distribution of the full vector of covariates. It is thus 
sufficient to match firms in terms of the propensity score in order to obtain the same probability 
distribution of covariates for treatment and control observations. 
In propensity score matching, an assumption known as unconfoundedness has to be 
satisfied so that the differences in ex-post performance variables between the treated 
observations and the controlled observations with the same values for covariates are attributable 
to the treatment effect of providing collateral (Becker and Ichino, 2002; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 
2008). To ensure this, the following balancing condition of pretreatment variables given the 
propensity score must be satisfied: 
() t t t X e X COLL ⊥  (2) 
In other words, for a given propensity score, treatment observations are randomly chosen, and 
therefore, the treatment sample and the non-treated sample are identical on average. 
  In order to verify that (2) holds, we implement the following testing procedure after 
the first step of the matching observation: (i) based on the estimated probit model, we split the 
sample such that the average propensity scores of the treated and non-treated groups do not 
differ, and (ii) within all intervals, test that the means of every element of  t X  do not differ 
significantly between treated and non-treated observations. If there are no statistically 
significant differences between the two, we can then proceed to estimate the treatment effect in 
the second step with some confidence. 
   16
5. Results 
5.1 Propensity Score Estimation 
We start from the propensity score estimation. Table 1 lists the means of the variables we use in 
this estimation. 
(Insert Table 1) 
  In our model, the propensity score is the conditional probability of a borrower 
pledging collateral and personal guarantees to its main bank in year t given the values of 
observed borrower characteristics and the borrower-bank relationship in the same year. There 
are two dependent variables, a binary dummy variable on the use of collateral in year t ( t COLL ) 
and a binary variable on the use of personal guarantees in year t ( t GUAR ). Note that as a result 
of the way we have constructed our data set, the values of  1 − t COLL  and  1 − t GUAR  are  zero. 
Explanatory variables are as follows. First, we employ the following borrower 
characteristic variables: the log of the number of employees ( t LnEMP ), the log of total 
borrowings ( t LnLIAB ), the capital-asset ratio ( t CAP ), the long-term borrowing ratio ( t LONG ), 
the land ratio ( t LAND ), profitability in terms of ROA ( t ROA ) and the interest coverage ratio 
( t ICOVER ), liquidity as measured by the cash-to-asset ratio ( t CASH ), the interest payment rate 
( t RATE ), and the dummy indicating whether a family member of the CEO is a major 
shareholder ( t OWNER ). In addition, considering the possibility that very risky firms newly 
pledge collateral more often than the other firms, we use three dummy variables to identify 
borrowers in financial distress. These is a dummy for a negative ROA ( t NG ROA_ ), a dummy 
indicating whether the interest coverage is less than or equal to unity ( t SM ICOVER_ ), and a 
dummy indicating whether the capital ratio is negative ( t NG CAP _ ). Second, two variables 
representing the intimacy of borrower-lender relationships are used: the number of banks 
( t BANKS ) and the log of the duration (in years) of the borrower-lender relationship   17
( t LnDURATION ). Third, to capture whether the collateral (personal guarantee) is pledged in 
tandem with the provision of personal guarantees (collateral), dummy variables for personal 
guarantees (collateral) in year t-1 and t are included as explanatory variables in the collateral 
(personal guarantee) equation. Finally, year, industry, and regional dummies as well as dummies 
for the type of main bank are included. 
The probit estimation results on the use of collateral and personal guarantees are 
presented in Table 2. In the estimation on the use of collateral, there are several significant 
coefficients.  t LONG is positive and significant, which is consistent with practitioners’ 
observation that long-term loans often finance purchases of machinery or equipment and these 
physical assets tend to be used as collateral. Similarly,  t LAND  is positive and significant, 
indicating that firms whose real estate holdings make up a larger share of their assets are more 
likely to pledge collateral. Regarding the firm performance variables, a significant positive 
coefficient is obtained for t SM ICOVER_ , while the coefficient on  t ICOVER  is insignificant. 
The significant positive coefficient on  t SM ICOVER_  suggests that whether borrowers fall 
below the threshold where their operating profits are sufficient to cover interest expenses is a 
critical determinant of whether lenders require collateral.  t LnDURATION  is positive and 
significant, implying that borrowers who have established a longer-term relationship with their 
main bank are more likely to pledge collateral. Finally, the coefficient on  t GUAR  is positive 
and significant, meaning that borrowers who pledge a personal guarantee to their main bank are 
likely to newly pledge collateral simultaneously.   
(Insert Table 2)   
In the estimation on the use of personal guarantees, there are several differences from 
the results for the collateral equation. Both  t LnEMP  and  t LnLIAB  have significant negative 
coefficients, implying that firms with fewer employees and smaller amounts of borrowing   18
outstanding tend to pledge personal guarantees more often. In addition, the dummy variable 
t OWNER  has a significant positive coefficient. Owner-CEOs are less hesitant to pledge 
personal guarantees since they have a sizable stake in the firm. Taken together, the result 
suggests that firms’ main bank tends to require personal guarantees from smaller firms that can 
be easily controlled by the owner-CEO, presumably in order to attenuate the risk of the 
commingling of representatives’ personal wealth and business assets. Although only weakly 
significant, the coefficient for the capital-asset ratio  t CAP  is negative, indicating that firms 
with less capital are more likely to pledge personal guarantees. Finally, similar to the result for 
the collateral equation, the coefficient on  t COLL  is positive and significant. Thus, borrowers 
who pledge collateral to their main bank are likely to newly pledge a personal guarantee 
simultaneously. 
 
5.2 Treatment Effect Estimation 
Having obtained the propensity score for each observation, we match each treatment 
observation of a borrower that pledges collateral (personal guarantees) in year t with control 
observations of borrowers that do not pledge collateral (personal guarantees) in that year. There 
are 115 treatment observations that newly pledge collateral and 179 treatment observations that 
newly pledge personal guarantees. We choose five neighboring control observations for each 
treatment observation in the same calendar year, in terms of the distance measured by the 
propensity scores. 
For these treatment and control observations that are matched, in order to examine 
Hypothesis 1 we use several variables to measure the change in borrowers’ performance 
between year t and year t+1. First, for both the treatment and the control group, the change in 
the performance variables is measured by
j




t ROA ROA − ≡ + , 
j
t CAP 1 + Δ , and   19
j
t ICOVER 1 + Δ , where  } , { C T j =  and T and C stand for the treatment and the control group, 
respectively. Because the change in the interest coverage ratio is also affected by the change in 
the interest payment rate, we also check 
j
t RATE 1 + Δ . Second, we examine the change in the 
probability of financial distress. We use several ways to define borrower financial distress, 
including default, a negative capital ratio, interest coverage less than or equal to unity, and a 
negative ROA. We measure the probability of a borrower falling into a certain type of distress 
and then take the difference in this probability between year t and year t+1. Hence, the change 
in distress probabilities is measured by ) 1 ( 1 = Δ + DEFAULT p
j
t ,
12   ) 1 _ ( 1 = Δ + NG CAP p
j
t , 
) 1 _ ( 1 = Δ + SM ICOVER p
j
t , and  ) 1 _ ( 1 = Δ + NG ROA p
j
t , where  } , { C T j = . Finally, for both 
performance variables and financial distress variables, we take differences in the change in these 





t ROA ROA 1 1 + + Δ − Δ . We then use these to estimate the treatment effect of pledging 
collateral or personal guarantees. 
Turning to the results, we begin with the treatment effect of pledging collateral, shown 
in Table 3. Among the borrower performance variables, 
T
t ROA 1 + Δ  is higher than 
C
t ROA 1 + Δ  by 
1.2 percentage points, which is the treatment effect and statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level. 
T
t CAP 1 + Δ  is higher than 
C
t CAP 1 + Δ  by 1.9 percentage points, and the difference is also 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
T
t ICOVER 1 + Δ   is higher than 
C
t ICOVER 1 + Δ , but the 
effect is not statistically significant. Note that 
T
t RATE 1 + Δ  is higher than 
C
t RATE 1 + Δ  by a 
statistically significant 0.7 percentage points, implying that borrowers pledging collateral face a 
larger increase in interest payment rates than those who do not. Looking at the variables of 
financial distress probabilities, we find that all of them show that borrowers in the treatment 
                                                      
12  Since we do not have data on defaults in year t, ) 1 ( 1 = Δ + DEFAULT p
j
t  is  actually 
) 1 ( 1 = + DEFAULT p
j
t .   20
group see a greater reduction in their probability of falling into financial distress than those in 
the control group. Specifically, the differences between the treatment and the control group are 
significant at the 1% level for  ) 1 _ ( 1 = Δ + SM ICOVER p
j
t  and significant at the 5% level for 
) 1 _ ( 1 = Δ + NG ROA p
j
t .  
Finally, in order to examine Hypotheses 2 and 3, we estimate the treatment effect 
measuring the changes in financial conditions from year t-1 to year t. We do so because these 
hypotheses presume contemporaneous relationships between the proxy variables employed and 
the pledging of collateral and personal guarantees. Table 3 shows that the difference between the 
treatment and the control group is negative for
j
t DOC Δ , meaning that collateralized borrowers 
are somewhat less frequently monitored by their main banks than non-collateralized borrowers. 
This contradicts the monitoring hypothesis, although the effect is statistically insignificant. 
Turning to the credit availability variables, consistent with the prediction that collateralized 
borrowers will experience an improvement in credit availability, the differences between the 
treatment and the control group are positive, but statistically insignificant, for both the index 
variable indicating main banks’ response to borrowers’ loan applications, 
j
t RES Δ , and for the 
fixed asset ratio 
j
t FIXED Δ ,. Thus, we cannot state that for collateralized borrowers the main 
bank exerts either more or less intensive monitoring effort, or that the bank becomes either more 
or less accommodative in approving loans. 
(Insert Table 3) 
Next, we present the results for the treatment effect of pledging personal guarantees, 
shown in Table 4. In comparison with the results obtained for collateral, the number of variables 
for which the difference between the treatment and the control group is statistically significant is 
limited. Among the borrower performance variables, 
T
t ROA 1 + Δ  and 
T
t CAP 1 + Δ  are slightly 
higher than the control group counterparts, but the difference is not significant. Moreover,   21
T
t ICOVER 1 + Δ  is lower than 
C
t ICOVER 1 + Δ  and the effect is weakly significant at the 10% level, 
hinting at a deterioration in the ex-post performance of borrowers that pledge personal 
guarantees. Among the variables representing the probabilities of financial distress, the 
probabilities of falling into negative net worth (
j
t CAP 1 + Δ ) and a profit deficit (
j
t ROA 1 + Δ ) display 
a larger decrease for the treatment group than the control group, but the margins are not 
significant. Finally, regarding the variables on monitoring frequency and credit availability, the 
coefficient obtained for 
j
t DOC Δ  is consistent with Hypothesis 2, but the effect is not 
significant and the signs of the coefficients on 
j
t RES Δ  and 
j
t FIXED Δ  are contradictory to 
Hypothesis 3. 
(Insert Table 4) 
 
5.3 Robustness Check 
The results presented in the previous subsection are based on a sample which completely 
excludes borrowers that received government credit guarantees. Restricting our sample in this 
way is effective in controlling for the distorting influence of government guarantees on 
borrowers’ decisions with regard to the use of collateral or personal guarantees. However, 
eliminating all borrowers with loans that are subject to government guarantees, even when these 
loans make up only a miniscule fraction of loan portfolios, comes at a cost, namely that the 
sample is limited to larger and less risky SMEs. 
Hence, as a robustness check of our results, we conduct similar estimations in which 
the potentially distorting role of government guarantees is controlled in a less stringent manner. 
That is, we exclude from the sample only those borrowers whose entire loans supplied by their 
main bank are covered by government credit guarantees. Extending loans to firms whose entire 
loans are covered by government guarantees is riskless for banks. In this case, banks have no   22
incentive to require borrowers to pledge collateral or personal guarantees. In contrast, banks do 
have incentives to require collateral or personal guarantees when not all of a borrower’s loans 
are covered by government guarantees. 
The results of these estimations, shown in Tables 5 (the propensity score estimation) 
and 6 (the treatment effect estimation), are qualitatively not very different from the base case 
results for the sample consisting only of firms with no government guarantees at all.
13 In the 
first-step probit estimation to obtain propensity scores, we find that the overall fitness of the 
equations improves as indicated by the increase in Pseudo R-squared. The level of significance 
of most explanatory variables is qualitatively the same as in the base case, except for some firm 
performance variables in the collateral equation. That is, in contrast with the result in the base 
case, the positive coefficient on  t SM ICOVER_   becomes insignificant. Moreover, the 
coefficient on  t ROA  is positive and significant, implying that more profitable firms tend to 
pledge collateral more often. The added explanatory variable  t GOVGUAR , which is the binary 
dummy variable representing whether a borrower partially uses government credit guarantees 
for loans supplied by the main bank, has a positive and significant coefficient both in the 
collateral and the personal guarantees equation: borrowers using government guarantees tend to 
pledge collateral and personal guarantees more often than borrowers that do not rely on such 
guarantees. Turning to the second-step estimation to obtain the treatment effect, we observe that 
the effect is qualitatively the same but not as statistically significant as in the base case 
estimations. With respect to the treatment effects for collateral, all the coefficients for the 
ex-post firm performance variables have the same signs as in the baseline estimation except 
for
j
t CAP 1 + Δ , whose coefficient is reversed but is statistically insignificant. The profitability of 
                                                      
13  The summary statistics for the sample consisting of firms that partially use government 
guarantees are presented in the Appendix Table.     23
collateralized borrowers improves and their probability of financial distress declines when 
compared with non-collateralized borrowers, but the size of the coefficient becomes smaller and 
their statistical significance decreases. With respect to Hypotheses 2 and 3, there is no strong 
supportive evidence: the signs of 
j
t DOC Δ , 
j
t RES Δ , 
j
t FIXED Δ  are consistent with the 
monitoring and availability hypotheses, but their effects are not statistically significant. 
Regarding personal guarantees, we find some evidence that the probability of being in financial 
distress is higher for those firms that pledge personal guarantees: the coefficients on 
) 1 _ ( 1 = Δ + SM ICOVER p
j
t  and  ) 1 _ ( 1 = Δ + NG ROA p
j
t  are positive and significant. In contrast 
with the positive treatment effects for collateral, we cannot find evidence that personal 
guarantees mitigate moral hazard on the part of borrowers and improve their ex-post 
performance. 
(Insert Tables 5 and 6) 
As another robustness check of the results obtained in the base case, we estimate the 
treatment effects for collateral and personal guarantees using different matching algorithms: 
10-nearest matching, Kernel matching, and radius matching. For our robustness check using 
different matching algorithms, we use the sample consisting only of firms that used no 
government credit guarantees at all. Kernel matching is a nonparametric estimation technique 
that uses the weighted averages of nearly all observations from the non-treated observations to 
construct the control group. Radius matching chooses all observations that lie within an 
arbitrarily determined “radius (propensity score range)” as the control group.   
  The results using these alternative matching algorithms are displayed in Tables 7 and 8, 
presenting the treatment effect estimations for collateral and personal guarantees, respectively. 
Although there are a few cases in which the sign or the statistical significance of coefficients is 
different from the 5-nearest matching estimation in Section 5.2 (Tables 3 and 4), the results are   24
qualitatively the same. Collateralized borrowers experience a greater improvement in ex-post 
performance than non-collateralized borrowers, and this treatment effect is weaker for personal 
guarantees.
14 
(Insert Tables 7 and 8) 
 
5.4 Discussion 
On balance, the results of the above estimations indicate that the treatment effect of providing 
collateral is that it lowers the riskiness and increases the profitability of firms that pledge 
collateral. On the other hand, these effects are tenuous in the case of personal guarantees. Given 
these results, our next task is to consider how these improvements are achieved. Our main 
hypothesis (Hypothesis 1) is that the effects are brought about by the reduction of moral hazard 
on the part of borrowers. The alternative hypotheses are the following:  the monitoring 
hypothesis, according to which collateral or personal guarantees induce banks to exert greater 
monitoring effort, which in turn results in borrowers exercising greater discipline in reducing 
their riskiness (Hypothesis 2); and the availability hypothesis, according to which borrowers 
obtain better access to funds and thus improve their quality by investing in projects with 
positive net present values (Hypothesis 3). In contrast with Hypothesis 1, these hypotheses 
focus on how lenders’ actions affect borrowers’ performance. 
In the propensity score estimation, pledging collateral is positively associated with 
observed borrower riskiness. And in the treatment effect estimation, borrowers with collateral 
see an increase in their profitability and a reduction in their riskiness as represented by the 
                                                      
14  One notable exception is the treatment effect for personal guarantees in the estimation using 
radius matching. Here, we observe that the probabilities of default and negative net worth become 
smaller for the treatment group (borrowers that pledge personal guarantees). These findings are 
consistent with Hypothesis 1. However, because we do not obtain similar results from the other 
matching procedures, we decided not to attach much importance to this result.   25
probability of falling into financial distress. These results are consistent with the predictions of 
Hypothesis 1.
15  
The variables we employed to examine Hypotheses 2 and 3 are 
j
t DOC Δ , 
j
t RES Δ , 
and 
j
t FIXED Δ . The signs of these variables are inconsistent with the hypotheses in some cases, 
and the coefficients are consistent but insignificant in other cases. Thus, we cannot find 
supporting evidence for these hypotheses.   
Therefore, we may infer that collateralized borrowers improve their performance by 
their own managerial effort or by refraining from asset substitution. Table 9 reinforces this 
conjecture. Here, we decompose the improvements in 
j
t ROA 1 + Δ  (treatment effects in Tables 3 
and 7) into three factors: the increase in gross sales, the reduction in expenses, and the reduction 
in total assets.
16 If the greater improvements in the profitability of collateralized borrowers 
(treatment effects) were driven by an increase in the availability of credit to finance new 
investment projects (Hypothesis 3), then it is likely that, as a result of the new investments, we 
would observe an increase in gross sales that would contribute to an improvement in ROA. 
Table 9 shows, however, that the main reason for the improvement in collateralized borrowers’ 
ROA is a reduction in expenses, while the contribution of gross sales to the improvement in 
collateralized firms’ profitability was actually negative. In other word, collateralized borrowers 
seem to increase their profitability through cost-cutting restructuring. This evidence is 
                                                      
15  Admittedly, even though the empirical evidence of the propensity score and treatment effect 
estimations supports Hypothesis 1, we cannot reject the signaling hypothesis which was briefly 
referred to in footnote 5. It is still possible that borrowers who appear risky use collateral to signal 
that they are actually riskless and reveal that they are indeed riskless through their ex-post 
performance. 
16  To be precise, the first term of the following equation corresponds to the increase in gross sales, 
while the second corresponds to the reduction in expenses and the third corresponds to the reduction 




























where S, C, and A represent gross sales, expenses, and total assets, respectively.   26
contradictory to the availability hypothesis, but is compatible with the theory that collateralized 





Focusing on Japanese SMEs, which tend to be dependent on bank loans, we examined the 
effectiveness of collateral and personal guarantees in improving the ex-post performance of 
firms, such as their profitability and the probability of falling into financial distress. The 
examination was based on a unique panel data set of more than 500 Japanese SMEs covering 
the years 2001-2005. 
Employing the matching estimation approach, we found that riskier firms were more 
likely to pledge collateral, and their profitability tended to increase and their riskiness tended to 
decline one year later. Most of the estimation results are consistent with the moral hazard 
hypothesis, according to which risky firms increase their efforts or refrain from asset 
substitution once they have pledged collateral, and as a result end up with improvements in their 
ex-post performance. The monitoring and availability hypotheses may offer alternative 
explanations, but we do not find sufficient supportive evidence in our empirical analysis. These 
results become tenuous for personal guarantees. 
As far as we know, this is the first empirical analysis on collateralized borrowers’ 
ex-post performance which controls for the possible selection bias in the provision of collateral. 
There are various possible extensions to this analysis. One is to widen the time window for 
observing borrowers’ ex-post performance. Currently, we only have a one-year window for 
                                                      
17  Although we do not find supportive evidence for the monitoring hypothesis (Hypothesis 2) in the 
matching estimations, the results in Table 9 may be consistent with the monitoring hypothesis in that 
the cost-cutting restructuring of collateralized borrowers may be the result of pressure from their 
main bank.   27
analysis due to data availability constraints. However, as more data become available over time, 
we may be able to extend the window to several years. Another possible extension would be to 
construct the data set in a different manner. In this paper, we limited our sample to borrowers 
that did not pledge collateral in year t-1  and identified the treatment effect by contrasting 
borrowers pledging collateral in year t with those that did not. As an alternative, we could 
choose borrowers that pledged collateral in year t-1 and identify the effect of collateral by 
contrasting borrowers ceasing to pledge collateral in year t with those continuing to pledge 
collateral. This would allow us to address the very interesting question of whether newly 
pledging collateral and ceasing to pledge collateral have symmetric treatment effects. Tackling 
these issues may reinforce this paper’s findings, as well as further expand our understanding of 
how the provision of collateral attenuates moral hazard and how ceasing to pledge collateral 
exacerbates it.   28
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
All COLL(t)=1 COLL(t)=0 All GUAR(t)=1GUAR(t)=0
GUAR(t) 0.440 0.617 0.393
(0.497) (0.488) (0.489) 
GUAR(t-1) 0.431 0.557 0.397
(0.496) (0.499) (0.490) 
COLL(t) 0.584 0.704 0.547
(0.493) (0.458) (0.498) 
COLL(t-1) 0.597 0.693 0.567
(0.491) (0.463) (0.496) 
ROA 0.025 0.023 0.026 0.024 0.022 0.025
(0.047) (0.044) (0.048)  (0.046) (0.048) (0.046) 
ICOVER 30.778 18.212 34.155 22.286 13.980 24.819
(111.942) (70.012)  (120.595)  (87.208) (62.552) (93.340) 
CAP 0.339 0.373 0.330 0.343 0.380 0.331
(0.249) (0.247) (0.249)  (0.221) (0.222) (0.220) 
ROA_NG 0.175 0.226 0.161 0.187 0.218 0.177
(0.380) (0.420) (0.368)  (0.390) (0.414) (0.382) 
ICOVER_SM 0.221 0.313 0.196 0.248 0.330 0.223
(0.415) (0.466) (0.398)  (0.432) (0.471) (0.417) 
CAP_NG 0.031 0.035 0.030 0.014 0.017 0.014
(0.174) (0.184) (0.172)  (0.119) (0.129) (0.116) 
LnEMP 3.851 3.871 3.845 4.316 3.880 4.448
(1.048) (1.026) (1.055)  (1.060) (1.042) (1.030) 
LnLIAB 12.887 12.672 12.945 13.529 12.784 13.757
(1.911) (1.828) (1.930)  (1.771) (1.876) (1.674) 
LONG 0.363 0.426 0.346 0.400 0.479 0.376
(0.366) (0.347) (0.369)  (0.330) (0.357) (0.318) 
LAND 0.085 0.114 0.077 0.117 0.131 0.112
(0.105) (0.111) (0.102)  (0.119) (0.119) (0.119) 
CASH 0.181 0.180 0.182 0.153 0.196 0.140
(0.151) (0.137) (0.154)  (0.131) (0.150) (0.122) 
RATE 0.019 0.020 0.019 0.020 0.023 0.019
(0.020) (0.016) (0.021)  (0.017) (0.019) (0.016) 
OWNER 0.508 0.609 0.481 0.441 0.721 0.356
(0.500) (0.490) (0.500)  (0.497) (0.450) (0.479) 
BANKS 4.033 3.504 4.175 4.658 3.911 4.886
(3.670) (2.647) (3.890)  (3.698) (2.876) (3.888) 
LnDURATION 3.068 3.236 3.023 3.287 3.287 3.288
(0.816) (0.747) (0.828)  (0.703) (0.722) (0.697) 
Number of observations 543 115 428 766 179 587
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Mean
COLL(t-1)=0 GUAR(t-1)=0
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Table 2: Propensity Score Estimation 
LnEMP 0.108 -0.161 **
(0.087) (0.073)
LnLIAB -0.068 -0.140 **
(0.065) (0.059)
CAP -0.274 -0.640 *
(0.425) (0.358)
LONG 0.445 ** 0.115
(0.193) (0.184)






























Constant 0.863 1.487 *
(1.396) (0.898)
Year Dummies Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes
Dummies for Main Bank Type Yes Yes
Number of observations 543 766
Pseudo R-sq 0.146 0.221
Log likelihood -239.573 -324.436
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Table 3: Treatment Effect Estimation for Collateral 
Period Treatment Control
ROA t 0.022 0.023
t+1 0.032 0.021 0.012 **
CAP t 0.380 0.373
t+1 0.396 0.370 0.019 **
ICOVER t 10.857 20.267
t+1 24.943 27.787 6.567
RATE t 0.018 0.024
t+1 0.020 0.018 0.007 ***
p(DEFAULT) t 0.000 0.000
t+1 0.000 0.006 -0.006 *
p(CAP_NG) t 0.021 0.042
t+1 0.000 0.051 -0.029 *
p(ICOVER_SM) t 0.299 0.280
t+1 0.138 0.290 -0.170 ***
p(ROA_NG) t 0.221 0.213
t+1 0.116 0.227 -0.120 **
DOC t-1 1.569 1.502
t 1.585 1.575 -0.058
RES t-1 2.479 2.442
t 2.479 2.383 0.058
FIXED t-1 0.269 0.300
t 0.280 0.309 0.002
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Table 4: Treatment Effect Estimation for Personal Guarantees 
Period Treatment Control
ROA t 0.021 0.029
t+1 0.024 0.028 0.004
CAP t 0.378 0.411
t+1 0.393 0.425 0.001
ICOVER t 15.438 21.110
t+1 16.687 33.787 -11.428 *
RATE t 0.021 0.022
t+1 0.020 0.022 0.000
p(DEFAULT) t 0.000 0.000
t+1 0.000 0.000 0.000
p(CAP_NG) t 0.012 0.006
t+1 0.006 0.006 -0.006
p(ICOVER_SM) t 0.317 0.266
t+1 0.273 0.221 0.001
p(ROA_NG) t 0.210 0.178
t+1 0.222 0.214 -0.023
DOC t-1 1.664 1.595
t 1.794 1.682 0.043
RES t-1 2.435 2.426
t 2.377 2.501 -0.133 *
FIXED t-1 0.308 0.281
t 0.311 0.288 -0.004
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Table 5: Propensity Score Estimation (Users of Partial Government Guarantee) 
LnEMP 0.097 -0.142 **
(0.077) (0.067)
LnLIAB -0.032 -0.105 **
(0.058) (0.053)
CAP -0.256 -0.674 **
(0.374) (0.325)
LONG 0.393 ** 0.131
(0.174) (0.169)
LAND 1.274 ** 0.750
(0.599) (0.485)




























GOVGUAR(t) 1.106 *** 0.939 ***
(0.193) (0.190)




Year Dummies Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes
Dummies for Main Bank Type Yes Yes
Number of observations 701 928
Pseudo R-sq 0.262 0.323
Log likelihood -317.625 -399.284
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Table 6: Treatment Effect Estimation (Users of Partial Government Guarantee) 
Period Treatment Control Treatment Control
ROA t 0.019 0.020 0.018 0.025
t+1 0.027 0.019 0.008 * 0.020 0.025 0.001
CAP t 0.334 0.328 0.339 0.359
t+1 0.340 0.342 -0.008 0.350 0.377 -0.006
ICOVER t 7.161 12.938 10.314 12.652
t+1 15.064 16.131 4.710 11.790 19.364 -5.236
RATE t 0.021 0.019 0.022 0.023
t+1 0.022 0.018 0.003 ** 0.021 0.024 -0.002 **
 
p(DEFAULT) t 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
t+1 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.004 0.001 0.003
p(CAP_NG) t 0.025 0.038 0.020 0.007
t+1 0.012 0.041 -0.015 * 0.012 0.006 -0.007
p(ICOVER_SM) t 0.346 0.316 0.356 0.351
t+1 0.203 0.241 -0.068 0.312 0.215 0.092 ***
p(ROA_NG) t 0.263 0.223 0.228 0.234
t+1 0.138 0.194 -0.096 *** 0.248 0.190 0.064 **
DOC t-1 1.625 1.520 1.764 1.619
t 1.725 1.498 0.122 1.913 1.774 -0.006
RES t-1 2.432 2.375 2.372 2.369
t 2.469 2.353 0.059 2.339 2.418 -0.083
FIXED t-1 0.231 0.277 0.297 0.278
t 0.241 0.281 0.006 0.302 0.283 0.000
Note 1: ***, **, * indicate a significance level of 1, 5, and 10%, respectively.
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Table 7: Treatment Effect Estimations for Collateral (Different Matching Algorithms) 
Period Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control
ROA t 0.022 0.025 0.022 0.024 0.022 0.026
t+1 0.032 0.024 0.011 ** 0.032 0.024 0.011 ** 0.032 0.028 0.008 *
CAP t 0.380 0.370 0.380 0.368 0.380 0.338
t+1 0.396 0.368 0.018 ** 0.396 0.367 0.017 ** 0.396 0.345 0.008
ICOVER t 10.857 20.902 10.857 19.171 10.857 28.898
t+1 24.943 33.222 1.766 24.943 29.767 3.490 24.943 39.346 3.637
RATE t 0.018 0.022 0.018 0.022 0.018 0.018
t+1 0.020 0.018 0.006 *** 0.020 0.017 0.006 *** 0.020 0.017 0.003 **
p(DEFAULT) t 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
t+1 0.000 0.007 -0.007 *** 0.000 0.003 -0.003 *** 0.000 0.001 -0.001 ***
p(CAP_NG) t 0.021 0.038 0.021 0.039 0.021 0.022
t+1 0.000 0.047 -0.031 ** 0.000 0.046 -0.028 * 0.000 0.033 -0.033 **
p(ICOVER_SM) t 0.299 0.284 0.299 0.290 0.299 0.194
t+1 0.138 0.274 -0.151 *** 0.138 0.277 -0.148 *** 0.138 0.219 -0.185 ***
p(ROA_NG) t 0.221 0.213 0.221 0.207 0.221 0.156
t+1 0.116 0.233 -0.125 *** 0.116 0.222 -0.120 *** 0.116 0.175 -0.125 ***
DOC t-1 1.569 1.542 1.569 1.513 1.569 1.615
t 1.585 1.591 -0.034 1.585 1.582 -0.053 1.585 1.712 -0.082
RES t-1 2.479 2.419 2.479 2.471 2.479 2.394
t 2.479 2.390 0.029 2.479 2.433 0.039 2.479 2.374 0.020
FIX t-1 0.269 0.295 0.269 0.287 0.269 0.269
t 0.280 0.303 0.003 0.280 0.295 0.003 0.280 0.272 0.007











10-Nearest Matching Kernel Matching
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Table 8: Treatment Effect Estimations for Personal Guarantees (Different Matching 
Algorithms) 
Period Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control
ROA t 0.021 0.026 0.021 0.026 0.021 0.024
t+1 0.024 0.026 0.003 0.024 0.026 0.003 0.024 0.029 -0.002
CAP t 0.378 0.411 0.378 0.393 0.378 0.339
t+1 0.393 0.425 0.001 0.393 0.412 -0.004 0.393 0.348 0.006
ICOVER t 15.438 21.310 15.438 19.858 15.438 22.446
t+1 16.687 28.062 -5.503 16.687 30.550 -9.443 16.687 27.173 -3.477
RATE t 0.021 0.022 0.021 0.022 0.021 0.018
t+1 0.020 0.021 0.000 0.020 0.022 -0.001 0.020 0.018 -0.001
p(DEFAULT) t 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
t+1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.0004 ** 0.000 0.002 -0.002 ***
p(CAP_NG) t 0.012 0.009 0.012 0.016 0.012 0.006
t+1 0.006 0.010 -0.007 0.006 0.009 0.001 0.006 0.014 -0.014 **
p(ICOVER_SM) t 0.317 0.268 0.317 0.280 0.317 0.237
t+1 0.273 0.227 -0.002 0.273 0.231 0.006 0.273 0.181 0.012
p(ROA_NG) t 0.210 0.199 0.210 0.188 0.210 0.183
t+1 0.222 0.214 -0.002 0.222 0.208 -0.008 0.222 0.157 0.039
DOC t-1 1.664 1.600 1.664 1.591 1.664 1.746
t 1.794 1.666 0.064 1.794 1.665 0.056 1.794 1.900 -0.024
RES t-1 2.435 2.435 2.435 2.470 2.435 2.390
t 2.377 2.557 -0.180 ** 2.377 2.520 -0.107 2.377 2.406 -0.073
FIX t-1 0.308 0.292 0.309 0.285 0.308 0.312
t 0.311 0.297 -0.002 0.312 0.293 -0.004 0.311 0.318 -0.003










10-Nearest Matching Kernel Matching Radius Matching
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5-nearest matching 0.012 -0.005 0.017 0.001 -0.001
10-nearest matching 0.011 -0.025 0.036 0.001 -0.001
Kernel matching 0.011 -0.024 0.034 0.000 0.000




Contributions to the treatment effect
 
Note: The figures for treatment effects of collateralized borrowers with respect to ROA are taken from 
Tables 3 and 7. Decomposition of the treatment effects is as follows: 



























 where  S, C, and A represent gross sales, expenses, and total assets, respectively. The first term 
corresponds to the increase in gross sales, while the second corresponds to the reduction in 
expenses and the third corresponds to the reduction in total assets. The final term represents the 
cross-factor term.   39
Appendix Table: Summary Statistics (Users of Partial Government Guarantee) 
All COLL(t)=1 COLL(t)=0 All GUAR(t)=1GUAR(t)=0
GUAR(t) 0.536 0.742 0.447
(0.499) (0.439) (0.498) 
GUAR(t-1) 0.512 0.662 0.447
(0.500) (0.474) (0.498) 
COLL(t) 0.546 0.768 0.459
(0.498) (0.422) (0.499) 
COLL(t-1) 0.546 0.717 0.480
(0.498) (0.451) (0.500) 
GOVGUAR(t) 0.190 0.427 0.086 0.130 0.374 0.032
(0.392) (0.496) (0.281)  (0.337) (0.485) (0.175) 
GOVGUAR(t-1) 0.168 0.352 0.088 0.100 0.269 0.032
(0.374) (0.479) (0.284)  (0.301) (0.444) (0.177) 
ROA 0.022 0.018 0.024 0.020 0.016 0.022
(0.050) (0.053) (0.049)  (0.048) (0.047) (0.049) 
ICOVER 24.177 10.034 30.351 22.951 12.836 27.916
(99.586) (53.131)  (113.580)  (100.549) (98.476)  (101.245) 
CAP 0.321 0.308 0.326 0.337 0.330 0.339
(0.241) (0.228) (0.247)  (0.237) (0.236) (0.237) 
ROA_NG 0.205 0.272 0.176 0.199 0.241 0.181
(0.404) (0.446) (0.381)  (0.400) (0.428) (0.385) 
ICOVER_SM 0.271 0.380 0.223 0.277 0.382 0.226
(0.445) (0.487) (0.417)  (0.448) (0.486) (0.419) 
CAP_NG 0.034 0.042 0.031 0.018 0.026 0.015
(0.182) (0.202) (0.173)  (0.134) (0.159) (0.121) 
LnEMP 3.692 3.545 3.756 4.119 3.712 4.298
(1.066) (1.051) (1.067)  (1.097) (1.057) (1.067) 
LnLIAB 12.705 12.512 12.789 13.436 12.775 13.736
(1.842) (1.620) (1.927)  (1.964) (1.761) (1.979) 
LONG 0.398 0.469 0.366 0.434 0.504 0.402
(0.356) (0.324) (0.365)  (0.329) (0.332) (0.323) 
LAND 0.083 0.099 0.076 0.109 0.128 0.100
(0.107) (0.116) (0.103)  (0.116) (0.118) (0.115) 
CASH 0.190 0.199 0.186 0.160 0.198 0.144
(0.149) (0.143) (0.151)  (0.137) (0.143) (0.131) 
RATE 0.021 0.023 0.020 0.020 0.024 0.018
(0.022) (0.015) (0.024)  (0.020) (0.021) (0.019) 
OWNER 0.578 0.709 0.520 0.453 0.754 0.336
(0.494) (0.455) (0.500)  (0.498) (0.431) (0.473) 
BANKS 3.997 3.751 4.105 5.300 4.193 5.727
(3.643) (3.279) (3.789)  (5.911) (3.964) (6.459) 
LnDURATION 3.005 3.086 2.970 3.279 3.279 3.280
(0.845) (0.816) (0.856)  (0.691) (0.729) (0.675) 
Number of observations 701 213 488 928 308 620
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Mean
COLL(t-1)=0 GUAR(t-1)=0
 